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Mandatory Reassignment as a
Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans With Disabilities Act Turns
“Nondiscrimination into
Discrimination”
1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine an employer is hiring for a position requiring
three years of experience. The employer is choosing between two
applicants within its company: one who is highly qualified and
has over fifteen years of experience, and the other who is less
qualified and has only three years of experience. Although both
meet the necessary qualifications, an employer will likely choose
the more-qualified applicant. The decision to hire the more
qualified candidate, however, can be complicated and may not
even be permissible if the less-qualified applicant manifests a
disability.2 This is because the employer is required to comply
with the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which contains
an ambiguous provision that allows for employee reassignment
as a mandatory reasonable accommodation.3 The ADA is
designed to prevent discrimination and to preserve the integrity
of an employer’s hiring system when an employee becomes
disabled.4 However, Congress lists suggestions for reasonable
accommodations an employer may utilize but it is unclear if
reassignment is mandatory.5 Employment agencies and courts
have interpreted the ambiguous provision differently, which has
1 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333,
1346 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terrell v. Usair, 132
F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998)).
2 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A), 12111(9)(B), (2012); Richard Meneghello,
Fisher Phillips, Court: Employees Seeking Accommodation Must Compete for
Reassignment—Split in the Circuits Could Lead to Supreme Court Intervention,
JDSUPRA (Dec. 28, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/court-employees-seekingaccommodation-74575/ [https://perma.cc/S746-B7YR].
3 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A); see also St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1345.
5 See infra Section I.C.
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led to different interpretations and a lack of a consistent
standard.6 This is precisely the issue at hand: to which
interpretation should the employer adhere, mandatory
reassignment or not?
The problem lies in the interpretation of the ADA’s
provision that suggests reassignment “may” be a reasonable
accommodation.7 The statute’s provision containing the word
“may”8 creates confusion over whether reassignment is always
reasonable.9 Reasonable accommodation in the ADA refers to any
accommodation required for an employee with a disability to
equalize success and opportunity in the workplace.10 The United
States Supreme Court attempted to provide a framework for
interpreting the term “reasonableness” regarding reassignment as
a reasonable accommodation in Barnett.11 Absent special
circumstances, employer compliance for reassignment offered as a
reasonable accommodation is not required to comply with the ADA
if such a reassignment violates the company’s existing seniority
rules.12 This framework was narrowly extended to reassignment
cases that violated a disability-neutral rule13 categorically with
respect to seniority systems.14 The standard is subjective and
creates even more uncertainty regarding how employers not
using a seniority system should comply with the ADA.15
Hence, when confronted with the question of whether
reassignment is mandatory outside the seniority system, circuit
courts have issued contradictory rulings.16 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) contend
that reassignment is always a required reasonable accommodation
Meneghello, supra note 2.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1345.
8 Id.
9 Meneghello, supra note 2.
10 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, POLICY BRIEF SERIES: RIGHTING THE ADA
NO. 10, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AFTER BARNETT 5 (2003).
11 U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
12 Id. at 406.
6
7

The typical seniority system provides important employee benefits by creating,
and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment. These benefits
include job security and an opportunity for steady and predictable
advancement based on objective standards. . . . [T]o require the typical
employer to show more than the existence of a seniority system might well
undermine the employees’ expectations.
Id. at 404.
13 A disability-neutral rule is one that “seeks only ‘equal treatment’” regardless
of a disability, such as a seniority system. Id. at 397.
14 Id. at 402–06.
15 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 10.
16 Meneghello, supra note 2.
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regardless of who is the most-qualified applicant.17 These circuits
support the proposition that reassigning a disabled employee must
always bypass the best-qualified application process in order to
comply with the ADA.18 By contrast, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits concluded that disabled
employees applying for reassignment are required to compete in
the application process and should not be given priority over more
qualified applicants due to their disability status.19
On December 15, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit further
polarized the positions by rejecting the mandatory position
adopted by the Tenth and D.C. Circuits, and adopting the position
of the Eighth and Fifth Circuits.20 The Eleventh Circuit correctly
argues that mandatory reassignment creates uncertainty and
unfairness.21 Mandating reassignment would require employers
to sacrifice more qualified employees at the expense of less
qualified employees to satisfy the ADA, negatively impacting
business efficacy and profit.22 To justify abandoning the
mandatory reassignment position, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that the best-qualified applicant process emulates the seniority
system in Barnett, because it functions as a disability-neutral
rule.23 This justification seems to suggest that the decision
rendered in Barnett extends beyond the scope of seniority systems
and can be extrapolated to all similar decisions.24
Consequently, the split is widening, and employers are left
with little guidance on how to comply with the ADA regarding
employee reassignment.25 This note argues that the best way to
appease all circuit courts and the contentions of the EEOC is
through a two-prong test addressing: (1) the qualification of the
applicant; and (2) a cost-benefit analysis that will outline some of
the factors that the Court should consider.26 The Supreme Court
should use this two-prong test because it will bind all the circuit
courts to one interpretation and illuminate the compliance issues
for employers while taking into consideration the rights owed to
employees with disabilities under the ADA. Additionally, the twoId.
Id.
19 Patrick Dorrian, Disabled Workers Must Compete for Job Reassignments,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.bna.com/disabled-workers-compete-n730
14448413/ [https://perma.cc/9D8G-445C].
20 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333,
1345. (11th Cir. 2016).
21 See id. at 1345–46.
22 Id. at 1346.
23 Id. at 1346; see also U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397–98 (2002).
24 St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1346.
25 Meneghello, supra note 2.
26 See infra Part V.
17
18
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prong test will preserve the goals of businesses while
simultaneously safeguarding individuals with disabilities. In
order for employers to comply with the ADA,27 there must be a
unifying standard28 to interpret ambiguous components of the
statute, specifically, whether reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation is mandatory or not.
Part I of this note addresses the history and purpose of
the ADA, and explains the reasonable accommodation
safeguards for disabled employees. Part II discusses the
foundational Supreme Court case, Barnett, regarding the
dubious standard the Court articulated, as well as the
concurring and dissenting arguments. Part III details the circuit
split regarding the differing interpretations of mandatory
reassignment as a reasonable accommodation outlined in the
ADA, and addresses the impact of the Eleventh Circuit’s most
recent decision. Part IV explains the impact of the circuit split
on employers and workers with disabilities. Part V evaluates
possible solutions to the split, addresses potential problems with
the recommended solution, and suggests that the Supreme
Court interpret the reasonableness of mandatory reassignment
through a two-prong test using factors regarding the
qualification and severity of the employee’s disability as well as
the impact to the employer. This note concludes that the most
effective interpretation of the ADA is through a uniform
approach for the future to bind all circuit courts and ensure
compliance with the ADA.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON ADA SAFEGUARDS FOR
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

A.

Purpose and Creation of the ADA and EEOC

The unemployment rate for individuals with disabilities is
eight percent, which is nearly double the rate of non-disabled
workers.29 To help mitigate this disparity, Congress passed the
Americans With Disabilities Act in 1990 to protect individuals with
disabilities from discrimination in employment, education, and
public accommodations.30 Title I of the ADA states, “no covered
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2012).
Meneghello, supra note 2.
29 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU LAB. STAT.: ECON. NEWS RELEASE, USDL-190326, PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY: LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS—2018 (2019) https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4E6-Q6JR].
30 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)); see also What Is the Americans with
27
28
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entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis
of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee, compensation,
[or] job training,”31 which applies to employers with fifteen or more
employees.32 To enforce the employment non-discrimination
compliance provision of the ADA, Congress extended the authority
of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).33 Before determining if discrimination took place, a
plaintiff must actually meet the definition of disability.34
B.

Meeting the Definition of “Disability”

Section 12102 of the ADA defines “disability” as “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities.”35 A disability that falls within the
ADA cannot be minor, but rather, it must “substantially limit”36
the individual’s ability to perform his or her job.37 The term
“substantially limits” means the disabled employee can no
longer complete a major life activity or is severely restricted in
performing a major life activity compared to an average person.38
This interpretation is read in accordance with the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, which Congress passed to restore the
goals and purpose of the original ADA of 1990 by loosening the
threshold to increase coverage.39

Disabilities Act (ADA)?, ADA NAT’L NETWORK, https://adata.org/learn-about-ada
[https://perma.cc/E4ZD-F2PZ].
31 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
32 Id. § 12111(5)(A) (2012) (“‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees”).
33 Id.
§ 12117; U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ [https://perma.cc/V8RG-BDKC].
34 42
U.S.C. § 12102 (2012); The EEOC investigates allegations of
discrimination against employers. In order to prevail on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must
prove a prima facie case that: (1) the individual has a disability; (2) the individual is
qualified for the job; and (3) an adverse employment decision was made because of the
individual’s disability. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842
F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2016).
35 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012). This section further suggests a nonexhaustive list of such major life activities and major bodily functions. Id. § 12102(2).
36 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2018).
37 See Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 237–39 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding a hearing
impairment did not constitute as a substantial impairment because there were mitigating
devices used to lessen the impact of the disability).
38 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2018).
39 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012)) (“Congress finds that the current
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ADA regulations defining the term
‘substantially limits’ as ‘significantly restricted’ are inconsistent with congressional
intent, by expressing too high of a standard.”).
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Additionally, the EEOC interprets substantially limited
as “an impairment [that] disqualifies an individual from a
significant number of jobs for which the person would otherwise
be qualified.”40 Thus, the term substantially limited does not
extend to those individuals who are unable to perform a one job
but rather encompasses those individuals, with respectively the
same skills and training as an average person, who have a
reduced ability to perform a wide range of jobs.41 The United
States Supreme Court initially ruled that an individual is not
substantially limited and thus does not meet the definition of
manifesting a disability if the individual has the ability to control
his or her condition.42 Under the original interpretation, the
burden posed on a diabetic taking insulin is much higher than an
individual without the benefit of medicine or assistance, and thus
would not qualify as an individual with a disability.43
Congress changed this mitigation interpretation when it
passed the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.44 Under this version,
Congress decided that the Court’s determination was “an unduly
restrictive view of what constitutes as substantial limitation,”45
uncoupling the interpretation by assessing the status of the
individual without the use of the necessary assistance to
function normally.46 Congress reinterpreted the Court’s
construction by classifying the individual as disabled although
the individual maintains a method of controlling the disability.47
Thus, an individual with diabetes prescribed insulin to control
the disability now has a chance to qualify as disabled under the
ADA, as a disability determination does not follow from merely
having a diagnosis.48 For instance, a temporarily disabled
individual with a broken arm would not qualify under the
“disability” definition under the ADA because this disability is

40 John E. Murray, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008: Redefining Who Is
Disabled, 81 WIS. LAW. (2008), https://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/
pages/article.aspx/archives/article.aspx?Volume=81&Issue=12&ArticleID=1634 [https://
perma.cc/FA5G-CP37].
41 Id.
42 Murray, supra note 40 (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,
534 U.S. 184, 197–98 (2002)).
43 Id.
44 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2008)).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 The EEOC uses individualized assessments to determine if the individual
suffers from a substantial disability based off objective factual evidence. Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(iv), (3) (2018).
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only temporary.49 In order to uniform claims and prevent
employment discrimination for disabled employees, Congress
amended the ADA to address reasonable accommodations.50
C.

Safeguards for Reasonable Accommodations to Prevent
Employment Discrimination

Three specific provisions in the ADA govern employer
methods for reasonably accommodating disabled employees.51
Section 12112(a) of the ADA prohibits employers from
discriminating against disabled individuals, who are otherwise
qualified, when hiring or conducting other business-related
procedures.52 To prevent employment discrimination and ensure
compliance with the ADA, Section 12112(b)(5)(A) additionally
requires employers to implement reasonable accommodations
for disabled individuals unless it “would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business.” 53 Finally, Section
12111(9)(B) defines what a reasonable accommodation for an
employee entails and lists examples of what an employer may
do, such as reassignment to a vacant position.54
In order to prevent employment discrimination, the ADA
provides the requisite foundation employers must comply with in
order to reasonably accommodate their disabled employees.55
Congress did not specify an exact method, but rather merely
suggested some reasonable accommodations an employer may
utilize.56 After the passage of the ADA, the Supreme Court had to
deal with whether filling an already occupied position based on a
seniority system violated the ADA which then led to additional
uncertainty amongst employers faced with the unanswered
question of whether an employer had to reassign a disabled
employee to a vacant position in violation of the employer’s
seniority system.57 Due to the lack of clear direction from
Congress, some employers have interpreted the provisions for
49 The ADA: Your Responsibilities as an Employer Addendum, U.S. EQUAL
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2008) https://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada17.html
[https://perma.cc/V6S3-8H4R].
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(9)(B), 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (2012).
51 Id. §§ 12111(9)(B), 12112(a), (b)(5)(A).
52 Id. § 12112(a).
53 Id. § 12112 (b)(5)(A).
54 Id. § 12112(9)(B). “‘[R]easonable accommodation’ may include . . . reassignment
to a vacant position.” Id.
55 Id. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A); see also U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v.
St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 1345 (11th Cir. 2016).
56 See infra Part II.
57 U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391(2002); Huber v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting a split among circuits on the
answer to this question).
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reasonable accommodations as suggestions, rather than
requirements, resulting in litigation.58 Consequently, circuit
courts have been divided on the issue of reasonableness and
whether it is contingent on specific factual circumstances.59 To
clarify the ambiguity as to what reasonable accommodation
entails and instances where reassignment may not be required,
the Supreme Court in Barnett, attempted to create a workable
standard to guide employers in the seniority system context.60
II.

THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES REASONABLENESS IN
U.S. AIRWAYS, INC., V. BARNETT

In U.S. Airways, Inc v. Barnett, the Supreme Court
infamously wrestled with the interpretation of Section 12101 of the
ADA with respect to the narrow issue of employer seniority
systems.61 Robert Barnett injured his back while on the job at U.S.
Airways, and, because of his physical constraints, was relocated to a
less laborious mailroom position.62 The mailroom position was
subject to U.S. Airway’s seniority system whereby senior employees
were allowed to bid on different positions within the company based
on seniority.63 Barnett requested to maintain his mailroom position
despite bids by more senior applicants as per a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA, but U.S. Airways refused due to his
lack of ‘senior status’ within the company.64 As a result, the Supreme
Court was forced to balance the interests presented between the
workers with disabilities and the senior workers.65 Section 12112(a)
prohibits an employer from discriminating against a disabled
employee who can perform the essential functions of the job with
“reasonable accommodation.”66 But Section 12112(a) is limited by
Section 12112(b)(5) which rejects the reasonable accommodation if
it “impose[s] an undue hardship on the operation of [its] business.”67
The primary issue the Supreme Court had to resolve was whether
compliance with Title I of the ADA trumped U.S. Airway’s
established seniority system in order to provide a reasonable
accommodation to Barnett as a result of his back injury.68

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Meneghello, supra note 2.
See infra Part III.
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 393–94.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
Id. § 12112(b)(5).
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393–94.
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The Court declined to extend preferential treatment
violating a disability-neutral rule69 as seniority systems are not
per se unreasonable and accommodations that blatantly
disregard them are ordinarily trumped.70 U.S. Airways argued
that reasonably accommodating Barnett, and violating its
seniority system, unfairly advantaged the disabled workers over
more-senior workers who are not disabled.71 Describing U.S.
Airways’ argument, Justice Breyer wrote, “[the requested
accommodation violates a disability-neutral workplace rule, such
as a seniority rule, [because] it grants the employee with a
disability treatment that other workers could not receive. Yet the
Act . . . [only seeks] ‘equal’ treatment for those with disabilities.”72
The Court later dismissed this argument as not dispositive. It
explained that accepting preferential treatment violating a wellestablished seniority system would extend beyond the ADA’s
intended coverage, creating a rights imbalance.73 The Court
limited the scope of the ruling to suggest that affirmative conduct
is sometimes needed to “promote entry of disabled people into the
work force,”74 but seniority systems “ordinarily” are reasonable.75
The only way a seniority system would not be reasonable,
however, is if special circumstances exist, such as exceptions
embedded within the seniority system that make the outright
disregard of the accommodation unreasonable.76 Thus, a plaintiff
may overcome the undue hardship standard through a rebuttable
presumption by presenting evidence of the existence of special

Id. at 393–94.
Id. at 403.
71 Id. at 397.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 401.
75 Id. at 403.
76 Id. at 405 (citing Borkowski v. Valley Cent. School Dist., 63 F.3d131, 137 (2d
Cir. 1995)) (“[A]n accommodation that imposed burdens that would be unreasonable for
most members of an industry might nevertheless be required of an individual defendant
in light of that employer’s particular circumstances.”).
69
70
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circumstances;77 otherwise, the direct violation of a seniority
system “warrants summary judgment for the employer.”78
The Court’s reasoning takes into account several
factors.79 Principally, by supporting established employer
systems, it strengthens the employer-employee relationship by
ensuring uniform treatment amongst employees through
objective standards.80 The logic behind this rule implies that an
employee’s effort is contingent on their success and security
within their job, established by obtaining a senior position.
Historically, seniority systems have been in place for decades,
and disregarding them would constitute an undue hardship to
both the company and non-disabled employee.81 Additionally,
there is a lack of congressional support suggesting the statute
intended to destroy seniority systems to accommodate disabled
employees.82 Hence, accommodations that violate seniority
systems are ordinarily unreasonable.83
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in her concurrence,
modified the Court’s test by requiring an analysis of the legal
enforceability of the seniority system.84 She addressed the
reasonable accommodation of “reassignment to a vacant position”
and asserted that the seniority system would be unreasonable if
it “prevents the position in question from being vacant.”85 “Indeed,
the legislative history of the Act confirms that Congress did not
intend reasonable accommodation[s] to require . . . ‘bumping’
another employee out of a position. . . .”86 O’Connor projected that
an equitable remedy should not impose hardships on other
77

Id. at 405–06.

The plaintiff (here the employee) nonetheless remains free to show that special
circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence of a seniority
system (which the ADA may not trump in the run of cases), the requested
“accommodation” is “reasonable” on the particular facts. . . . The plaintiff
might show, for example, that the employer, having retained the right to
change the seniority system unilaterally, exercises that right fairly frequently,
reducing employee expectations that the system will be followed—to the point
where one more departure, needed to accommodate an individual with a
disability, will not likely make a difference. The plaintiff might show that the
system already contains exceptions such that, in the circumstances, one
further exception is unlikely to matter. We do not mean these examples to
exhaust the kinds of showings that a plaintiff might make.
Id. at 405 (citations omitted).
78 Id. at 406.
79 Id. at 403–05.
80 Id. at 393.
81 Id. at 395.
82 Id. at 405.
83 Id. at 405–06.
84 Id. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 408–09 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (1994)).
86 Id. at 410 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990)).
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employees, and if the position is by definition occupied,
reassignment to that position by definition cannot be warranted.87
Although O’Connor employed a different analysis than the
majority opinion, she agreed with the Court’s outcome.88
On the other hand, the dissent argued the Court’s opinion
is defective because the accommodation of “reassignment to a
vacant position” would be rendered meaningless under the ADA if
“the disabled employee [was only] considered for a vacant
position.”89 Because the ADA’s purpose is to prohibit discrimination
with respect to hiring, it follows that “a disabled employee must be
given preference over a non-disabled employee when a vacant
position appears.”90 In accordance with the goals and purpose of
the ADA, reassignment to a vacant position is a necessary
accommodation because it abolishes the impediments “arising
solely from the disability.”91 The dissent qualified this argument
by limiting its conclusion to guaranteeing a disabled applicant
reassignment to a vacant position only if no one else is seeking
the position, or if a more qualified applicant exists, the position
will not be granted automatically.92
The dissent also critiqued the rebuttable presumption,
which allows employees to demonstrate special circumstances to
overcome a seniority system preference.93 The aforementioned
framework is too ambiguous as there is no exact criterion to
show “departure from seniority rules [are] ‘not likely to make a
difference.’”94 In sum, this standard gives disabled employees a
“vague and unspecified power . . . to undercut bona fide
[seniority] systems”95 which is inherently unclear and forms the
basis for litigation.96 Evidently, uncertainty exists as to what
special circumstances overcome a seniority system and how this
opinion extends to other situations outside of established
seniority systems. Justice Souter’s dissent contended that a
holistic approach must be utilized to determine if reassignment
to a vacant position qualifies as a reasonable accommodation.97
After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling, circuit courts,

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 410–11.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 418. “I have no idea what this [standard] means.” Id.
Id.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 422–23. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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next, had to rule on whether reassignment to a vacant position
was mandatory as a reasonable accommodation.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: MANDATORY REASSIGNMENT OR NOT?
Although Barnett attempted to resolve the ambiguity
regarding reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable
accommodation, circuit courts are still split on the issue of whether
reassignment to a vacant position is a mandatory
accommodation.98 The Supreme Court did not address the issue of
whether reassignment to a vacant position is a mandatory
reasonable accommodation, but rather only whether reassignment
to a vacant position suffices as a reasonable accommodation with
respect to seniority systems in a disability-neutral system.99 Thus,
the Supreme Court insufficiently resolved the ambiguity by failing
to render a decision as to whether the ADA mandates
noncompetitive reassignment. “By importing a reasonableness
standard without definition, the Supreme Court create[d], rather
than eliminate[d] or reduce[d], uncertainty in the ADA about when
accommodations are required.”100 To demonstrate this divisive
issue, circuit courts have adopted the “best-qualified applicant”
approach as an extension of Barnett’s narrow ruling.
A.

“Best-Qualified Applicant” Approach
1. “The ADA Is Not an Affirmative Action Statute”101

In Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Pam Huber suffered “a
permanent injury to her right arm and hand” while working for
the defendant corporation, Wal-Mart.102 Because of this, Huber
requested “as a reasonable accommodation, reassignment to a
router position.”103 Although Huber was qualified, Wal-Mart
declined to extend an offer to Huber, as “she was not the most
qualified applicant.”104 The issue was whether the ADA required
Wal-Mart to, as a reasonable accommodation, give Huber
preference in the general applicant pool where she was able to
perform the duties but not the most qualified candidate.105
Meneghello, supra note 2.
See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397 (majority opinion).
100 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 10.
101 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996)).
102 Id. at 481.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
98
99
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
concluded that “the ADA is not an affirmative action statute and
does not require an employer to [mandatorily] reassign a qualified
disabled employee to a vacant position” in violation of a legitimate
best-qualified applicant policy.106 Thus, the ADA does not
mandate reassigning a disabled employee to a position filled by a
higher-ranking applicant.107 The Eighth Circuit correctly
rendered a decision, as the ADA does not require an employer to
do any more for a disabled employee than level the playing field.108
Since the disabled employee was qualified for the position, and
would be whether she maintained a disability or not, the ADA was
of no use in this particular circumstance and thus mandatory
reassignment was not justified.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled on a similar question in Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.109
In Turco, John Turco worked as a chemical operator for thirteen
years at Hoescht Celanese Chemical Group, Inc.110 During his
employment, he developed adult onset diabetes but still remained
a competent worker.111 As per physician recommendation, and
due to his worsening condition, Turco applied for a technician
position but was not selected.112 As a result, Turco argued Hoechst
did not provide a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA
that resulted in unlawful discrimination based on his disability.113
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered Hoechst’s compliance with the ADA for reasonably
accommodating Turco and concluded Turco lacked the
qualifications of the essential functions of a chemical operator and
a technician position alike.114 The court ruled that “the [ADA] does
not require affirmative action in favor of individuals with
disabilities. It merely prohibits employment discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no less.”115
Here, Turco was not even qualified for the position, so mandating
reassignment to a vacant position would have undermined the
goals of the ADA and violated the Supreme Court’s standards by
creating an undue hardship on the employer.116 While the Eighth
Id. at 483; Meneghello, supra note 2.
Huber, 486 F.3d. at 484.
108 Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012)).
109 Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996).
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1093.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1094 (citing Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995)).
116 Id. see also US Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 416 (2002).
106
107
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and Fifth circuits noted that the ADA was not an affirmative action
statute, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit looked into whether the best-qualified applicant policy
could be judged as equivalent to a seniority system.
2. The Best-Qualified Applicant Policy Is Synonymous
with Seniority Systems
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit rendered the most recent decision regarding the
reasonable accommodation provision pursuant to the ADA. In
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp.,
Leokadia Bryk, “a nurse in the psychiatric ward of St. Joseph’s
Hospital,” developed spinal stenosis and arthritis, necessitating
the use of a cane.117 Bryk’s cane usage raised concerns with
performing her job, as it would pose a safety hazard if the
psychiatric patients attempted to use the cane as a weapon.118
The hospital allowed Bryk to apply to other positions within the
Hospital, despite Bryk’s limited qualifications for other
positions.119 Additionally, “the Hospital allowed Bryk to compete
with other internal candidates,” rather than the general pool of
applicants.120 The principal issue considered was whether the
ADA mandates noncompetitive reassignment.121
The Eleventh Circuit attempted to extend the Barnett
framework to guide the analysis, stating that the ADA does not
ordinarily require reassignment if it violates an employer
seniority system, unless a plaintiff can present evidence of special
circumstances.122 This framework, however, did not specifically
cater to the facts of St. Joseph’s Hosp., as it involved a bestqualified applicant policy rather than a seniority system.123 Here,
the court equated the employer’s best-qualified hiring policy with
a seniority system to argue that mandating reassignment would
not be reasonable.124 This justification suggested that the decision
rendered in Barnett extends beyond the scope of seniority systems
and can be extrapolated to all similar decisions.125
EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1338.
119 Id. The hospital also waived two requirements which normally applied to
internal candidates for transfer: (1) that the candidate be in his or her current position for at
least six months; and (2) that no final written warnings exist in the candidate’s record. Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1345.
122 Id. at 1346 (citing U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002)).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
117
118
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The court rationalized that disregarding a best-qualified
hiring policy would “impose[ ] substantial costs on the hospital
and potentially on patients.”126 This is mainly because “employers
operate their businesses for profit, which requires efficiency and
good performance,”127 so automatically reassigning a lessqualified employee would undermine employer’s goals, especially
in a hospital setting.128
Ultimately, the court found that “the ADA does not
require reassignment without competition for, or preferential
treatment of [people with] disab[ilities].”129 The court construed
the ADA generally to mean employers must reasonably
accommodate their disabled employees, but did not specify the
exact method for doing so.130 The use of the word “may”131 in the
ADA’s non-exhaustive list of reasonable accommodations
implied that reassignment to a vacant position can be
reasonable, but it is not always reasonable.132 The argument
suggests that because Congress failed to use binding language,
the intent for reassignment as a mandatory reasonable
accommodation does not comport with Congress’ intent.133 The
court interpreted the ADA to only require a disabled employee
to equally compete in the general applicant pool, not to create
additional challenges for the non-disabled employees.134 The
impact of this decision adds to the split with other circuit courts’
rulings contending that reassignment is mandatory.
B.

Reassignment Is Mandatory
1. The Tenth Circuit Interpreted the ADA’s Language
as Mandatory

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
issued the first opinion interpreting reassignment to a vacant
position to be a mandatory reasonable accommodation. In Smith
v. Midland Brake, Inc., Robert Smith worked as an employee for
seven years at Midland Brake.135 Smith’s job required him to test
Id.
Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. (citing May, MERRIAM-WEBSTER www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/may)
[https://perma.cc/6YPG-65J6].
132 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(9)(B) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ may
include . . . reassignment to vacant position.” (emphasis added)).
133 Id. at 1345 n.5.
134 Id. at 1346.
135 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
126
127
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air brakes for large vehicles, sometimes exposing him to
irritants and chemicals.136 As a result of his position, Smith
developed severe chronic dermatitis that prevented him from
working for periods of time.137 As per Smith’s physical
limitations, Smith was unable to perform and qualify for any of
the positions Midland Brake had to offer.138 Consequently,
Midland Brake declined to reassign Smith to a vacant position
within the company as a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.139 Midland Brake justified its decision by arguing that
Smith did not fall under the definition of a disabled individual
because Smith was not an otherwise qualified individual who
could perform the essential functions of any position.140 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had to first
address if Smith still met the definition of a qualified individual
under the ADA although he was unable to perform the essential
requirements of his position and, if so, whether Midland Brake
failed to reasonably accommodate Smith.
The court did not preclude Smith’s ADA claim for an
accommodation of reassignment based on Midland’s argument
that Smith did not meet the definition of a qualified individual.141
The court reasoned that in order to give the reassignment
requirement under the ADA teeth it “must mean something
more than merely allowing a disabled person to compete equally
with the rest of the world for a vacant position.”142 The Tenth
Circuit noted that the language used by other circuits in
interpreting
the
ADA’s
reassignment
provision
“is
143
instructive.”
In other words, reassignment is listed as a
reasonable accommodation because otherwise firing an
employee due to his disabling limitations would be “no
accommodation at all”144 and would function as discriminatory.145
Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, reassignment means
automatically giving a position to a qualified employee with a
disability regardless of the more qualified applicant pool.146

Id.
Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1161. “The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(8) (2012).
141 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1167.
142 Id. at 1165.
143 Id.
144 Ransom v. State of Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895, 902–03 (D.Ariz.1997).
145 Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164–65.
146 Id. at 1167; Meneghello, supra note 2.
136
137
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2. The D.C. Circuit Arrives at Mandatory Reassignment
Through an Unclear Standard
In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, Etim Aka had a job
that “required a substantial amount of heavy lifting and
pushing.”147 As a result of heart and circulatory problems, Aka
underwent bypass surgery, involving a rehabilitation period
during which he could not perform the functions of the job.148
Washington Hospital Center’s policy outlined that former
hospital employees would be considered preferentially in the
applicant pool over nonhospital employees, as a collective
bargaining agreement.149 As Aka applied for jobs, he did not
receive any interviews.150 Washington Hospital Center contended
that because Aka was no longer a qualified applicant due to his
physical limitations, he did not fall within the limits of section
12112(b)(5)(A), and were therefore not required to reassign him.151
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit rejected Washington Hospital Center’s
contention that Aka was ineligible for reassignment as a means of
reasonable accommodation.152 The court considered a multitude of
arguments but failed to state the boundaries of compliance by
skirting the issue.153 Specifically, the court “decline[d] to decide the
precise contours of an employer’s reassignment obligations” by
listing many reasons but no unified standard.154 Thus, it is unclear
what exact standard the D.C. Circuit adopted, but it rejected the
dissenting opinion that defined reassignment as simply submitting
an application to the general applicant pool.155
Overall, circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether
mandatory reassignment is always a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA and whether mandatory reassignment should be
extrapolated outside of the seniority system realm.156 Some
employers endorse the “best-qualified applicant” approach,
without running afoul of the ADA that proposes disabled
employees are required to compete in the application process and
should not be given priority over more qualified applicants due to

147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 1286–87.
Id. at 1287.
Id. at 1300 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (1994)).
Id. at 1305.
Dorrian, supra note 19.
Aka, 156 F.3d at 1305.
Id.
Meneghello, supra note 2.
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their disability status.157 However, other circuit courts and the
EEOC endorse the proposition that reassignment is always
mandatory, regardless of the disabled employee being the most
qualified.158 Such a split must be resolved as the uncertainty
created by the split negatively impacts an employer’s ability to
comply with the law and the legal rights of workers.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IMPACTS EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE AND
WORKERS RIGHTS WITH THE ADA
Perhaps the most pervasive problem of the split directly
impacts employer’s compliance with the ADA.159 Because employers
operate for profit, eliminating mandatory reassignment is an
appealing standard to follow, although the standard may not be
lawful.160 Even if an employer errs on the side of the EEOC’s
interpretation, the EEOC website is silent as to whether a disabled
employee should be given preferential treatment in a general
applicant pool, as was rejected by the Eighth Circuit.161 The EEOC
only contends that an employer must consider reassigning the
disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation.162 The ambiguity
surrounding this provision creates issues with compliance, leaving
employers in the dark and subject to litigation.163 By the same token,
lacking a uniform standard “may . . . create unnecessary confusion
and encourage forum shopping or vigorous jurisdiction-based legal
battles.”164 Additionally, it is more appealing for employers to select
the more qualified applicant over a less-qualified disabled applicant
for purposes of efficiency and effectiveness.165 This inherently forces
employers to make uninformed business decisions and “adopt
inconsistent reassignment policies.”166
Additionally, the circuit split impacts the rights of workers
with disabilities under the ADA. Disabled employees will either
be mandatorily reassigned or subject to competitive reassignment
solely contingent on the employer’s choice. Disabled workers’
rights are also contingent on their physical geographical location
that may afford them more or less rights than other disabled
Dorrian, supra note 19.
Meneghello, supra note 2.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2006); U.S.
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 49.
162 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 49.
163 Meneghello, supra note 2.
164 Nicholas A. Dorsey, Mandatory Reassignment Under the ADA: The Circuit Split
and Need for a Socio-Political Understanding of Disability, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 468 (2009).
165 EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333,1345–46 (11th Cir. 2016).
166 Dorsey, supra note 164, at 468.
157
158
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workers.167 Even if disabled workers are automatically reassigned
without meeting the necessary qualifications, their coworkers
may harbor resentment and ostracize the employee.168 Thus,
disabled employees do not have a concrete standard to determine
if their rights are actually being violated. Moreover, disabled
employees are at an inherent disadvantage when suing deeppocketed employers as litigation costs are expensive, and if the
suit is unnecessary, resources will be wasted.169
Overall, the ADA’s goals are rendered meaningless and
cannot be achieved if employers are not complying with a
uniform interpretation. Without a consistent and uniform
standard, employers are incentivized to do the exact opposite of
what the ADA purports to achieve.170 Employers will avoid hiring
disabled applicants because of the unpredictable adherence
consequences and the exorbitant cost associated with such
ambiguity.171 These types of decisions force employers to make
discretionary value decisions that “elevate[ ] workplace norms
over individualized assessments.”172 This can undermine
disabled employee’s rights because employers are allowed to
prioritize employer policies over individual’s rights and the
ADA’s goals via their own discretion.173 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court may correct for this lack of uniformity that may
resolve this discretionary decision once and for all.
V.

HOW AND WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RESOLVE
THE SPLIT

A.

“Best-Qualified Applicant” Approach: Interpreting
Reassignment Is Not Mandatory

Although many critiques argue that competitive
reassignment would render the ADA meaningless, employing a
non-competitive reassignment would actually render the act moot
by discriminating against the most-qualified applicant just
because the applicant does not maintain a disability that would
automatically guarantee the position. In order to create a
consistent standard, the Supreme Court must step in and clarify
the law. Implications from Barnett suggest that the Court’s
Id. at 469.
See id.
169 See id. at 468–69 n.190.
170 Scott C. Thompson, Note, Open for Business: The ADA Beyond an Employer’s
Front Door, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 383, 388 (2011).
171 Id.
172 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 10, at 14.
173 Id. at 15.
167
168
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reasonableness standard extends to guide “outside of the seniority
context.”174 This previous standard suggests that once an
accommodation is judged to be reasonable it is automatically
mandatory. The Supreme Court seems to unanimously agree,
based on the majority and minority opinions, that the ADA should
only eliminate the impediments created by the disability.175 In
fact, the dissenters justified their position that a disabled
applicant should not automatically be guaranteed the position if
a more qualified applicant exists because of the inequality this
preferential treatment creates amongst equally qualified, if not
more-qualified, applicants.176
B.

Two-Prong Test Solution

If the Supreme Court should take up the case, instead of
using the “reasonable[ness] in the run of cases”177 framework, the
Court should implement a two-prong test178: (1) the qualification
of the applicant; and (2) a cost-benefit analysis that will outline
some of the factors that the Court should consider. The purpose
and usefulness of this test will address all circuit court
contentions and ensure a fair outcome for both employers and
disabled applicants, creating an amicable solution. Moreover, the
solution comports with the ADA and incentives of both parties. In
order to meet the test, a qualified applicant meets the first prong
and satisfies the test, however, not being qualified fails the first
prong and sends the applicant to the second prong.
For the first prong, the Court should consider if the
applicant is capable of performing the essential functions of and is
qualified for the position or, for that matter, any positions within
the company at all. If the answer is “yes,” then the disabled
employee should be considered within the general applicant pool
and the inquiry ends there. Because reasonable accommodation
refers to any accommodation, the disabled employee “may need in
order to have an equal opportunity to succeed in the employment
position,”179 allowing preferential treatment of a disabled applicant

Id. at 10; see also U.S. Airways, Inc., v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002).
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 408.
176 Id. at 414–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 402–03 (majority opinion).
178 Readers should note that I have created this two-prong test as an
extrapolation from Court’s opinion in Barnett in efforts to extend the “reasonable[ness]
in the run of cases” framework as a workable standard for all types of cases. Id. at 402–
03 (majority opinion). Additionally, I have accounted for different scenarios presented in
the circuit court cases addresses in infra Part 0 to develop the cost-benefit analysis.
179 NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 10, at 5.
174
175
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is unnecessary as the disabled applicant already possesses the
necessary qualifications to succeed at the employment position.
Similar to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Huber,180
reassignment is not mandatory simply because the applicant
was qualified for the position. Both the majority and minority
opinions agree in Barnett that mandating workers with
disabilities to automatically get the position over another
applicant is not permissible.181 Even without the ADA’s
existence, the disabled employee still has the opportunity to
compete for the job, and the disabled employee is not at a
disadvantage due to his disability. Allowing a disabled worker
to have preferential treatment over another qualified applicant
undermines democracy and disregards the goals of the ADA,
such as equality.182 Thus, if the disabled employee is qualified for
the position, the inquiry should end there because inevitably
there will be someone more qualified for a position, regardless of
a disability, and preferential treatment would disrupt the
balance of rights all applicants are entitled to.
If the answer to the question whether the disabled
employee meets the ADA Statutory and Regulatory definition of
“qualified” for a position in the company is “no,” then the disabled
employee should be considered in the internal applicant pool
instead, similar to the process employed by the Eleventh Circuit.183
An internal applicant pool will already advantage the disabled
employee over the general applicant pool and bypass some
individuals who are more qualified for the position.184 The internal
applicant pool will leverage the disabled employee over many other
individuals, although the applicant may not even be fully qualified
for the position. If the disabled employee is the only applicant
within the internal applicant pool, the disabled employee should
acquire the position, ensuring that the employer meets the ADA
requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation for the
employee, given the employer exhausted all other forms of
180
181

Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2006).
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 399; see also Barnett, 535 U.S. at 410 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring).
See ADA NAT’L NETWORK, supra note 30.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(8) (2012); EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333,
1338 (11th Cir. 2016).
184 “Limiting the pool provides a legally justifiable defense for excluding people
from the hiring process.” Michael Roberts, Why Are Some Jobs Posted for Internal
Applicants Only?, BALANCE, (Oct. 17, 2017) https://www.thebalance.com/why-are-somejobs-posted-for-internal-applicants-only-1669557 [https://perma.cc/4PU9-68XA]. This
solution is legally justifiable because it serves as a compromise to the polarized solution
that the ADA proposes. An internal applicant pool for disabled workers strikes the
perfect balance between discriminating against outside better-qualified applicants and
discriminating against internal disabled applicants.
182
183
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reasonable accommodations. The justification for this lies in the
interpretation of the ADA and the fact that the disability would be
the sole impediment to employment. If the disabled employee is not
qualified, the employee fails the first prong, then the decision for
reassignment becomes contingent on the second prong that is
analyzed under a cost-benefit analysis.
The second prong should analyze the rights of both the
employer and the disabled employee by using a cost-benefit
analysis. This assessment will largely be implemented on a caseby-case basis, but the Court’s consistent analysis will create the
desired goal of a uniform interpretation. By analyzing each unique
case in a consistent way, the Court will formulaically achieve its
desired goal of uniformity. If the individual is not qualified for the
position, but because of their disability will permanently disqualify
the applicant from the position, the applicant should be considered
by undergoing a cost-benefit analysis that analyzes the applicant’s
specific circumstances.
Different than the rebuttable presumption laid out in
Barnett185 this analysis should determine the undue hardship to
the employer considering factors such as: (1) severity of the
disability; and (2) the impact of disability on the employer. For
instance, if the disabled employee is not qualified for the position
because he is one-year shy of experience, the cost to the employer
is not severe because the employee can presumably still perform
basic functions. On the other hand, if the disabled employee is
across the board not qualified and cannot perform the basic
functions of the position then the cost would be overwhelming to
the employer, akin to an undue hardship.186 Here, the rights of the
employer matter greatly as his primary goal is to hire based on
efficiency and potential profit.187 Thus, the hardship a nonqualified disabled employee would have on the employer should
factor into the Court’s analysis.188
The analysis should also be done through the lens of the
disabled employee as well by considering factors such as: (1)
opportunity for future employment; (2) contribution to the
company;189 and (3) special circumstances.190 If the disabled
employee has no opportunity for future employment because of the
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405.
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)-(B) (2012).
187 EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir. 2016).
188 Readers should note this test is similar to Barnett but considers an
unqualified employee rather than a qualified one.
189 Roberts, supra note 184 (“The hiring manager might need someone with
particular organizational knowledge . . . [and] at least has an idea of their reputations.”).
190 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405–06.
185
186
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impediment imposed by the disability, then the employer must
take into consideration his reassignment as mandatory if no other
method could accommodate the individual. This is different than a
substantial limitation analysis because although the individual
may qualify as disabled, the disability may not limit him from
every possible position within the company, but rather a broad
spectrum of positions.191 If the individual was an asset to the
company and contributed positively for many years but his
disability manifested later in life, preventing him from completing
the required tasks of his job, the employer should consider
preferential reassignment. Also, if the disabled employee
developed the disability as part of his job, the employer should give
preferential reassignment more weight, considering the employer
was the proximate cause of the disability. Thus, the decision for
reassignment is not per se mandatory, but rather contingent on the
Court’s consistent analysis and final judgment call considering the
factors through each party’s lens.
C.

Potential Problems

The two-prong test may have its costs such as
contradicting previous EEOC rulings or permanently ending the
claim that the ADA is an affirmative action statute. Regarding
the first prong which considers the qualifications of the disabled
employee, critics may argue that this prong is in direct conflict
with the EEOC’s framework as well as the decisions by the
Tenth and D.C. Circuits.192 These commentators may interpret
the ADA as affording additional safeguards to those employees
with disabilities because without them, a disabled employee’s
position in society would be neutral, which undermines the
purpose of the ADA.193 Even if these disabled employees are
qualified for the position, disabled employees deserve additional
measures to ensure equality.
In response to these criticisms, I argue that the exact
opposite goal will be achieved, because highlighting disabled
employees in society and advantaging these individuals over
other applicants simply due to a diagnosis overlooks the ability
and performance of a disabled employee. The internal applicant
pool solution may create difficulties with compliance as well.
Critics may argue that an internal applicant pool is akin to the
general applicant pool because, although the pool is narrower,
191
192
193

See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section III.B.
EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir. 2016).
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the position is not guaranteed. In response, an internal
applicant pool administers just enough of an advantage to
these disabled employees. By striking the right balance of
leverage over outside applicants, the internal applicant pool
suffices as a nondiscriminatory mechanism of preferential
treatment, appeasing both sides of the contentious debate.
The second prong of the test that outlines a cost-benefit
analysis from both perspectives may attract criticism as well.
Critics may contest the employer’s cost-benefit analysis suggesting
the ADA was created for disabled employees and not employers.
Additionally, the cost-benefit analysis may not yield consistent
results, which impacts compliance for future decisions by creating
uncertainty. In response, the formulaic method outlined in the twoprong test methodically analyzes each case in the same way and
ensures consistent weight be given to different factors present in
each situation, considering undue hardship and special
circumstance standards alike. As such, there will always be
critiques of any proposed solution, but the two-prong test creates,
on balance, an amicable solution to both sides of the debate.
D.

Current Solution

In the unlikely event the Supreme Court never faces this
issue, employers should follow a qualified standard argued but not
adopted in Barnett, suggesting that all disability-neutral rules, not
just seniority systems, should trump mandatory reassignment
positions.194 Although circuit courts are divided on its
interpretation, the standard elicited through a combination of the
majority and minority opinions can be combined to create a holistic
approach to bind all circuit courts’ interpretations that have not yet
addressed the issue.195 The Court considered a holistic approach
that can be extrapolated from the majority and dissenting opinion
suggesting that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the
existence of a seniority system should only be a factor in the
analysis.196 As a result, courts should consider a company’s hiring
system as a factor in the reasonable accommodation analysis. If the
hiring system is disability-neutral, courts should weigh in favor of
that system unless presented with “special circumstances.”197 The
majority and minority opinions indicate that mandatory
reassignment is not always reasonable,198 and thus circuit courts
194
195
196
197
198

Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397.
Id.
Id. at 423–24 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 421–22.
Id.
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should not disregard the best-qualified applicant in their hiring
procedures. Therefore, circuit courts should not extend preferential
treatment to disabled employees merely because he is disabled but
rather consider factors such as undue hardship and special
circumstances within their analysis as well.
CONCLUSION
The best-qualified applicant method analyzed under a
two-prong test should govern future decisions regarding
mandatory reassignment because the ADA’s definition of
reassignment is unclear and subject to varying interpretations.
The statute’s definition that a “‘reasonable accommodation’ may
include . . . reassignment to vacant position”199 created a circuit
split and confusion over whether reassignment is always
reasonable.200 Some circuits have held that reassignment is
always a reasonable accommodation and thus should be
interpreted as mandatory.201 This approach suggests that
employers should bypass the best-qualified applicant in order to
give preferential treatment to their disabled employees. Other
circuit courts contend that reassignment should not be
interpreted as a mandatory reasonable accommodation.202 This
approach emphasizes that a disabled applicant should not be
given preferential treatment over a more qualified applicant due
to their disability status.203
Despite the Court addressing a similar issue with
seniority systems in Barnett204 the framework established does
not clarify the Court’s position outside of the seniority system
realm.205 The framework only resolves cases when an employer is
faced with a disability-neutral rule and suggests that mandatory
reassignment would not be reasonable in these types of cases.206
The Court, however, failed to address cases where there is a lack
of a disability-neutral rule. The Court’s justifications seem to
suggest that if the Court were to take up a case without a
disability-neutral rule, it would rule the same way and decline to
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2012).
Meneghello, supra note 2.
201 Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
202 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333,
1346 (11th Cir. 2016); Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2006);
Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996).
203 Dorrian, supra note 19.
204 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402.
205 EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d 1333, 1346 (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 406).
206 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405.
199
200
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extend preferential treatment to a disabled applicant who is not
the best-qualified applicant.207
The Eleventh Circuit said it best: mandatory
reassignment for disabled employees turns “nondiscrimination
into discrimination.”208 As such, circuit courts should not require
mandatory reassignment as a method of preferential treatment
for disabled employees but rather assess the best-qualified
applicant method utilized by employers under a two-prong test.
This solution appeases both the employers’ and the EEOC’s
contentions and concerns regarding compliance with the ADA.
The two-prong test solves the issue by ensuring equality as well
as adding some weight to disabled employee applicants if
absolutely necessary. The two-prong test serves as a compromise
between two competing interests and ensures an amicable
solution. In order for employers to comply with the ADA, the
Court must take a case to resolve the dispute and create a
unifying standard by adopting the two-prong test.
Christina M. Loguidice†

Id. at 403.
St. Joseph’s Hosp., 842 F.3d at 1336 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Terrell v. Usair, 123 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998)).
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